Every plan
on by default from day one, nothing to configure
A fake meeting invite, a real Microsoft sign-in page and a code the victim types in themselves: that is all it takes to hand an attacker a signed-in Microsoft 365 session, with no password stolen and the victim's own MFA satisfied. Cybereinforce blocks that sign-in step in the browser, by default, for every organisation on every plan.
A meeting invitation, a shared document or a security review arrives with a short code and an instruction to "confirm your device".
The victim opens Microsoft's own device sign-in page and types the code. The address bar is genuine. This is the step Cybereinforce stops.
The code was the attacker's. When the victim approves MFA, Microsoft issues the session tokens to the attacker.
The attacker reads mail, Teams and SharePoint, and can register their own device so later activity looks trusted.
Everything in the sign-in logs looks right, which is exactly what makes analysts trust it.
| Domain | login.microsoftonline.com |
| MFA | satisfied |
| Device ID / name | present |
| Device trust type | Azure AD registered |
No malware, no attachment and no look-alike domain to find. By the time it is understood, the attacker may have been reading mail for days. (Illustrative values.)
One of the most effective Microsoft 365 takeover techniques is closed in every protected browser, with nothing for users to learn.
A lure that reached your staff becomes a visible, investigable block event, in the console and in Microsoft Sentinel.
No conditional-access project and no rule to maintain. It arrives with the extension and stays current.
Start a trial and open the device-code sign-in page yourself: you will see the block page instead.